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Abstract
Dissatisfaction with two‐party politics is at an all‐time high in the US. As extreme polarization and minority rule persist, a
possibility of an electoral reform becomes increasingly more likely. This editor’s introduction discusses the ranked choice
voting (RCV) as an alternative to the current single‐member geographic districts with winner‐take‐all plurality elections in
the US. The articles for this thematic issue critically evaluate whether RCV lives up to its promise in improving democracy in
the US. Like any rule or institutional change, it has benefits and drawbacks. The empirical and historical research presented
here focuses on the implementation and use of RCV in the US compared to other countries. This thematic issue offers new
insights into the promise and perils of RCV as a way to aggregate votes in elections that ensure that the winning candidate
receives a majority of the votes cast.
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1. Introduction
Dissatisfaction with two‐party politics is at an all‐time
high in the US. A 2021 Gallup poll reports 62% of
Americans believe the Democratic and Republican par‐
ties are doing such a poor job of representing their con‐
stituents and that a third party is needed (Jones, 2021). An
equal number believe change to the ‘fundamental design
and structure’ of the US government is necessary (Pew
Research Center, 2018). Today 4 in 10 Americans do not
identify with either of two parties, labeling themselves
political independents (Gallup, 2021; although scholars
find that many independents lean toward one of the
two parties and in two‐party elections vote like partisans;
see Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, & Westlye, 1992; Klar
& Krupnikov, 2016). Because campaigns are more likely
to mobilize voters who are registered with the parties
(Hersh, 2015), political independents in plurality election
systems are less likely to be contacted or to vote in elec‐
tions. They also have lower political efficacy (Donovan &
Bowler, 2004). Proportional electoral systems generally
create more equitable outcomes between political par‐
ties and encourage wider social group representation.
The predominance of just two major political parties
in the US is the result of election rules—single‐member
geographic districts with winner‐take‐all plurality elec‐
tions. This means the candidate with the most votes in
a district wins public office, even if that individual wins
less than a majority (50%+1) of the votes cast. This is
commonly referred to as Duverger’s law, which holds
that plurality rule elections within single‐member dis‐
tricts tend to favor a two‐party system (Duverger, 1954).
If election rules change, outcomes may change the num‐
ber of viable political parties. Electoral reform is possible
if a majority of elected officials believe they will bene‐
fit under a new system (Boix, 1999; Drutman, 2020) or
if reform is adopted directly by voters via an initiative
or referendum (Bowler & Donovan, 2000). The latter is
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how ranked choice voting (RCV) was adopted statewide
in Maine and Alaska. The Framers of the US Constitution
were silent on whether winner‐take‐all, pluralities or
majorities should decide elections.
Some argue the main problem with the current sys‐
tem in the US is that it forces the entire spectrum of polit‐
ical opinions into just two camps. Pew’s political typology
has consistently identified at least nine distinct ideolo‐
gies or groups using extensive nationwide polling (Pew
Research Center, 2017). The ideological space between
Democrat socialists like Bernie Sanders and President
Joe Biden who represents the Democratic party’s tradi‐
tional moderate‐liberal wing is one example. Likewise,
there are large ideological gaps between right‐wing pop‐
ulists like former President Donald Trump and mainline
pro‐business Republicans like Utah SenatorMitt Romney
(Donovan & Redlawsk, 2018). But with simple‐majority
(i.e., plurality) election rules, individuals are forced to
vote for one of the two party candidates (Democrats
or Republicans) or essentially throw away their vote,
as smaller parties almost never have enough votes to
win office. If third parties do get even a small share of
the vote, it can wreak havoc on the two‐party system.
Because of this, nearly one‐third of US presidents since
the Civil War were elected with less than 50% of the pop‐
ular vote (Donovan & Bowler, 2004).
The US is at a tipping point because of extreme
political polarization (Abramowitz, 2018). A July 7, 2020
Gallup poll found an 89‐percentage‐point difference
between Republicans’ and Democrats’ ratings of then
President Trump. Thiswas the largest partisan gapGallup
ever measured for presidential approval in a single sur‐
vey dating back to 1936. Political polarization in the
US is acerbated by high residential partisan segrega‐
tion, where most Democrats living in urban, suburban or
rural areas (high, medium or low density) rarely interact
with Republicans, and vice versa (Brown & Enos, 2021).
The result is that there is nothing pulling candidates to
the middle to appeal to a mixture of voters.
This severe polarization of US politics was not evi‐
dent in the middle of the 20th century. Drutman (2020)
argues that in themid‐1950s–mid‐1990s the political sys‐
tem in the US had de‐facto a four‐party system with
bothDemocrats andRepublicans splitting into liberal and
conservative wings. This de facto existence of four par‐
ties partially explains why the democratic system in the
US worked sufficiently during that time. Today, however,
toxic (affective, emotional, tribal) partisanship escalates
the political divide (Mason, 2018). For some, the only
way to de‐escalate politics is to split up the two major
parties and introduce more central parties to American
politics, parties that can fill in the ideological vacuum in
the middle of the political spectrum.
2. Ranked Choice Voting
One popular reform to give voters more choice of can‐
didates and parties is RCV or instant run‐off voting;
in other countries this is offered referred to as the
Alternative Vote. While Drutman (2020) advocates for
RCV combined with multi‐member districts to create a
form of proportional representation (PR), growing local
and statewide use of RCV with single member districts
in the US offers one avenue for reform. RCV is similar to
the Single Transferable Vote which allows voters to rank
candidates on an election ballot in order of preference,
rather than cast a single ballot for most preferred choice.
Voters can choose third party or independent candi‐
dates and not risk throwing away their vote. RCV could
reduce political polarization in America by giving candi‐
dates incentives to campaign for 2nd and 3rd place votes,
and not alienate voters whose first choice is someone
else (Grofman & Bowler, 1996). RCV may favor politi‐
cians that are more centrist because they can win with
many second‐place votes from both parties. The centrist
candidates would then be able to mend the ideologi‐
cally fractured country back together. RCV is designed
to produce a majority winner within single or multi‐
member districts.
RCV can be seen as a compromise of the current
plurality system in the US and pure PR systems found
in other countries. RCV or instant run‐off voting may
be better than two‐round elections for several rea‐
sons. First, the elections are more likely to result in a
widely acceptable leader with a broader base of sup‐
port (although this is not guaranteed; Richie, Oestericher,
Otis, & Seitz‐Brown, 2021). Second, voters do not need
to make complicated strategic calculations, choose the
lesser of two evils, or be concerned their votes might
be wasted because they can express multiple prefer‐
ences (but see Santucci, 2021, for possible limitations).
RCV may save governments money to avoid fielding mul‐
tiple elections (Drutman, 2020, pp. 182‐183). The advan‐
tages of RCV can include higher youth participation (see
Juelich & Coll, 2021) and representation for women in
public office (Terrell, Lamendola, & Reilly, 2021). When
survey respondents actually rank candidates, Coll (2021)
finds most demographic groups, including racial and eth‐
nic minorities, find ranking easy (see Donovan, Tolbert,
& Gracey, 2019, and experimental research by Maloy &
Ward, 2021).While RCVmay result in higher involvement
of constituencies in politics and elections, existing party
elitesmay oppose reform if their candidates fail to consis‐
tentlywin under the new rules (Santucci, 2021). Yet Reilly
(2021) shows how candidate and party endorsements
influence voters’ rankings in Australia and can, over time,
promote reciprocal ranking exchanges between parties
building support for the process and reducing negative
campaigning (see Kropf, 2021 on slates of candidates).
3. Why Does Ranked Choice Voting Matter Now?
Democratic Backsliding and Political Polarization
Why does RCV matter now? Because US political par‐
ties aremore polarized. In the 2016 presidential election,
Donald Trump won the Republican primaries with 38%
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of the votes cast in the first 33 states to vote. In the end,
he won 45% of the votes in Republican primaries (Richie
et al., 2021). Because no candidate had more votes, he
was the Republican party nominee. Under the Electoral
College and plurality voting rules (two states allocate
proportionally), Trump was elected president in 2016
despite winning 3 million votes fewer nationwide than
his Democratic opponent. This is minority rule (Owen,
2020). This same outcome occurred in the 2000 presi‐
dential election when George W. Bush was elected presi‐
dent and lost the popular vote. In 2024 or 2028 another
populist candidate outside of the mainstream—possibly
with little previous experience in politics—might win just
40% support in state‐by‐state primaries. He or she might
again fail to win a majority of the popular vote in the
general election but could be elected president. If win‐
ning candidates continue to lose elections (defined by
losing the popular vote), will the citizens still support
the government?
Other states/countries learned the hard way and
changed their election system after a war or an author‐
itarian leader. The US does not have safeguards to pre‐
vent candidates that don’t win a majority of votes in an
election from taking office as the parties lost their gate‐
keeping function after the 1972 election with the shift to
binding primaries (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, pp. 50–51).
This becomes more of a concern when far‐right factions
(or in the future, far‐left factions) take hold within one of
the two mainstream political parties.
Warnings that the US could backslide toward an
autocracy were driven in part by the Republican party’s
shift away from democratic norms and practices during
President Trump’s presidency (2016–2020). Backsliding
is used to describe a crisis of democracies, as authoritar‐
ian leaders and military governments gain new ground
globally. In 2021, Freedom House reported that scores
of democratic freedoms dropped for the 15th straight
year, as many countries restricted privacy rights to fight
the pandemic (Coppedge et al., 2021; Pemstein et al.,
2021). The Polity V score codes the characteristics of
countries in theworld on a comparative rating scale from
autocracy to democracy. Covering 167 countries from
1800–2020 with a population of over half a million peo‐
ple, Polity measures six components such as qualities of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive author‐
ity and political competition. Emphasis is placed on con‐
straints of elites—how much the president is checked
by parliament.
The Polity score measures government authority
on a 21‐point scale from −10 (hereditary monarchy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy). These scores are
often converted into three regime groups: ‘autocracies’
(−10 to −6), ‘anocracies’ (−5 to +5), and ‘democracies’
(+6 to +10). In 2020, the US dropped below the democ‐
racy threshold on the Polity scale to an anocracy/partial
democracy (Center for Systemic Peace, n.d.). Factors that
contributed to the drop included extreme political polar‐
ization and President Trump’s unwillingness to cooper‐
ate with congressional oversight during the impeach‐
ment. Additional factors were Trump’s challenge of the
2020 presidential election results, undermining public
trust in democratic elections. The more rigorous V‐Dem
electoral democracy score ranges from 0 to 1. The US
score dropped from .894 to .815 between 2016 and 2020
(Coppedge et al., 2021; Pemstein et al., 2021). While the
US Polity or V‐Dem scores may bounce back, the change
signifies a perception of political instability or a tipping
point. How much do election rules have to do with the
quality of democracy?
4. Do Election Rules Matter?
Election rules matter—they are the rules of the game.
Free, fair, and competitive elections are the minimum
necessary condition for democracy. Electoral processes
and rules, therefore, are the foundations of demo‐
cratic regimes. When it comes to attempts at strength‐
ening democracy in transitioning countries or non‐
consolidated democracies, changes to electoral rules are
often a main solution. The two main types of electoral
systems—plurality (or a special case of it: majoritar‐
ian) and proportional—exist in different political envi‐
ronments and are designed to produce two different
political outcomes. While plurality systems promote
single‐party governments with two major parties on
the political spectrum, proportional systems encourage
power‐sharing by generating governments with multiple
parties and party coalitions. As a result, majoritarian sys‐
tems provide more democratic accountability and pro‐
portional systems provide more diversity and represen‐
tation (Norris, 2004).
The observation that the simple plurality electoral
systems tend to produce two‐party systems was noted
in Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954, p. 217, as cited in
Cox, 1997, p. 14). In contrast, Duverger’s Hypothesis
states that “the simple‐majority system with second
ballot and PR favors multipartyism” (Duverger, 1954,
p. 239). Numerous studies of electoral systems pro‐
vide empirical evidence to support these arguments
(Boix, 1999). Interestingly, the US is the only exam‐
ple of the ‘pure’ Duverger’s law existence in practice,
because Britain, Canada, and India—countries with first‐
past‐the‐post elections—have small but persistent third
or even fourth parties (Bowler, Grofman, & Blais, 2009;
Grofman, Bowler, & Blais, 2009). Nevertheless, the elec‐
toral rules do matter for the number of parties in the
parliament, party behavior, as well as voters’ behavior.
By adopting one or another electoral system states can
‘control’ the number of major parties in the political
arena (Norris, 2004).
Norris (2004) finds that, in general, political parties
in PR electoral systems appeal to a particular sector of
the electorate, develop tight social networks and con‐
nections with their voters, and compete within a diverse
and dispersed political spectrum, as each party occupies
a particular sector of political ideology. PR systems are
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associated with higher voter turnout and greater satis‐
factionwith democracy (Karp, Banducci, & Bowler, 2003).
In majoritarian systems, parties face higher electoral hur‐
dles, appeal to diverse sectors of the electorate, con‐
centrate on overreaching issues (efficient public services,
economic growth, defense, etc.), and are usually located
in the center of the political spectrum, as well as the
center for social and ideological issues. Norris (2004)
also finds that social cleavages are weaker in majoritar‐
ian systems.
If we compare the summary of the majoritarian sys‐
tems provided by Norris (2004) with the political realities
in the US, it becomes clear that the two‐party system of
the US is an outlier. With the increasing political polariza‐
tion, the major parties in the US (at least the Republican
party) are moving further away from the center of the
ideological spectrum, reinforcing already strong social
cleavages (Mason, 2018). These outcomes are not typi‐
cal for majoritarian systems and, it can be argued, con‐
tribute to the current democratic struggles reflected in
the recently released democratic indices, such as V‐Dem
and the Polity score.
5. Are Multiparty Systems Better?
While multiparty systems provide clear benefits, it is
important to consider some of the potential drawbacks.
The major issue with multiparty democracy, the issue
that has been salient in Europe in recent years, is
that multiparty systems allow extremist parties to enter
the government. While this may be a negative conse‐
quence, Drutman (2020) argues that the representa‐
tion of extremist parties is a good thing. It provides
“a platform to vent and defuse grievances and let[s]
other parties adjust in response” (p. 207). This repre‐
sentation may lead to more transparency in extremist
party’s actions, predictability, and accountability. It may
limit the party’s influence of otherwise marginalized seg‐
ments of the society. This is a better outcome than when
a “hardline minority fraction [that] redefined the mod‐
ern Republican Party” (Drutman, 2020, p. 207) gains the
control over the presidency or a branch of Congress.
Whenextremist parties enter governments, their size
matters to the extent of the influence. As we saw in
the US, the control of the Republican party, one of
the two major parties, by a minority of the population
translated into the minority control of American poli‐
tics.With themultiparty system,minority control is close
to impossible.
Even with the rise of the popularity of the far‐
right parties in Western Europe, most of them remain
with a small representation in the parliaments. Sweden
Democrats, a nationalist and right‐wing populist polit‐
ical party in Sweden, is one of eight parties currently
represented in the Riksdag during the 2018–2022 elec‐
toral period. In 2018 the party won 62 out of 349 seats
(17.8%) in the parliament (Riksdagsförvaltningen, n.d.).
This is the largest number of seats Sweden Democrats
have won since they first entered the Riksdag in 2010
after overcoming the 4% electoral threshold. In Germany,
the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a nationalist and
right‐wing populist political party, is third out of the six
parliamentary groups in the Bundestag with 88 out of a
total of 709 seats (12.4%; German Bundestag, n.d.).With
the exception of Hungary and Poland, where national‐
ist parties hold the majority of the seats in the parlia‐
ments, and Switzerland where The Swiss People’s Party
is the largest in the Federal Assembly (although they do
not have the majority of the seats), the rest of nation‐
alist political parties in Europe represent the minority.
The benefits of multiparty systems may outweigh poten‐
tial drawbacks of the emergence of an extremist party.
6. Conclusions
By a different metric than Polity or V‐Dem scores,
US democracy exhibited resiliency in the 2020 presi‐
dential election with historic voter turnout breaking a
120‐year record. Due to the coronavirus pandemic that
increased efforts to avoid election day crowds, the mail‐
box became the ballot box. This milestone election saw
nearly two‐thirds of all votes cast early, roughly one‐
third of which were in‐person at polling locations and
two‐thirds by mail. Research finds state election laws
allowing mail/absentee voting, in person early voting
and same‐day registration, as well as updated election
administration processes, can increase voter turnout,
even for themost disadvantaged groups (Ritter & Tolbert,
2020). Yet a national law to protect voting access has
proven difficult, even under unified party control of
the presidency and congress. In 2021, the US House of
Representatives passed historic legislation (HR 1, For the
People Act) to protect voting rights nationwide, but it is
unlikely to be adopted by the US Senate or to become
law. Post the 2020 election multiple states adopted laws
to restrict use of mail/absentee voting. The US has a
patchwork of laws for voting access, with variation across
the 50 states.
Most agree US democracy faces challenges. RCV is
one reform of the election system that has been pro‐
posed to ensure winning candidates a majority of the
popular vote. The articles for this thematic issue criti‐
cally evaluate whether RCV lives up to its promise. Like
any rule or institutional change, it has benefits and draw‐
backs. The empirical and historical research presented
here focuses on the implementation and use of RCV in
the US compared to other countries. They offer new
insights into the promise and perils of RCV as a way to
aggregate votes in elections that ensure that thewinning
candidate receives a majority of the votes cast.
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